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Abstract 
Power electronics is becoming an underpinning technology for modern power systems. Power converters 
are increasingly used in various applications implying different levels of importance in power systems. 
Hence, optimal decision-making for manufacturing, control, operation and maintenance of them requires 
understanding of their importance in the power systems. Furthermore, identifying the converters importance 
may be beneficial for simplifying the system-level reliability modeling in a large Power Electronic based 
Power Systems (PEPSs). Thereby, a Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) approach is 
proposed in this paper in order to figure out the importance of converters in PEPSs. The failure modes are 
classified by contingency analysis and their effects are predicted by a power system risk measure. 
Afterwards, the critical modes and critical components are identified. The FMECA is exemplified by a wind 
farm connected to the grid through an HVDC transmission system. The obtained results imply the criticality 
of the HVDC control system, its DC filters followed by its converters.  
 Introduction 
Power electronics plays an underpinning role in modernization and decarbonization of the modern 
electric systems [1]. Power converters are increasingly used in a wide range of applications such as renewable 
energies, battery storages, electric vehicles and their charging stations, HVDC and MVDC systems [2]. 
However, power converters are one of the weaker links in this conversion process and may cause failures 
due to the possible huge system downtime and also costly maintenance. Thereby, in recent years with the 
high penetration of power electronics-based applications, reliability-oriented design and control of power 
electronic systems have gained the highest interest.  
Physics of failure analysis and accelerated tests are the approaches employed to model the lifetime of 
converter components (mostly power semiconductor switches and capacitors). The corresponding lifetime 
models are, hence, used in order to design a converter for a specific level of reliability. Moreover, control 
and protection schemes are used to enhance the lifetime and reliability of a converter during operation [3]. 
 
 
These efforts have been carried out in the component, converter and operation levels for a single or multiple 
converter [4] from a wear-out failure point of view, which is suitable for the design and manufacturing of 
converters.  
Besides design and control of converters, reliability-oriented operation, planning and maintenance of 
power electronic systems are of high importance. It requires system level reliability assessment approaches 
in order to model the system availability [5–7]. The system availability depends on its components failure 
rate and downtime or repair rate. For instance, the gear-box, control and electric system have a major 
contribution to the failure rate and downtime of wind turbines [8–11]. Furthermore, inverters have the 
dominant failure rate and downtime costs in photovoltaic systems [12, 13]. Following [8–13], the impacts of 
different components on the availability of single unit, i.e., Wind Turbine (WT) system or photovoltaic 
system, are illustrated based on historical reliability data. However, the contribution of the components at 
the power system level needs to be known as an important factor from the economical operation, planning 
and maintenance level points of view.  
The aforementioned issues are intensifying the significance of reliability modeling in a modern PEPS, 
specially its main and failure prone components such as power converters. The converter reliability modeling 
can be carried out at three hierarchal levels including device, converter and system levels [4]. Device level 
modeling requires to consider the very fast dynamics of operation such as semiconductor switching effects 
[14]. This may introduce more complexity for the system level analysis in the large PEPSs [15]. Therefore, 
understanding the importance of different converters in the overall system performances is important for 
time-efficient and simplified system-level analysis. 
This paper proposes a Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) approach in PEPSs in 
order to identify the weakest links of the system and its critical components. The main contribution of this 
paper is to analyze the reliability of a power electronic based power system with detailed reliability model 
of its sub-systems to show the importance of power electronics in the overall system performance. The 
obtained results would be useful for power system engineers to have an optimal planning and maintenance 
in modern power electronic based power systems. Also power electronic manufacturers could identify the 
critical components of the converters from a power system reliability point of view, and consequently have 
an optimal, reliable and economical design and control based on converter application and its importance in 
the system. Furthermore, it may facilitate system level reliability modeling of large PEPSs for design, 
planning and operation purposes.  
 Proposed Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
In this section, the general concept of FMEA/FMECA and the proposed FMECA approach for a PEPS 
are explained. The main concept is adopted from IEC 60812:2018 [16] and MIL-STD-1629A [17] and 
modified for power system applications as discussed in the following. 
A. General Concept of FMECA  
The FMEA/FMECA is a technique to brake an item or a system down into its elements to explore the failure 
modes and corresponding effects. The criticality analysis can also be performed in order to prioritize the 
failure modes for potential treatment. The main purposes of FMEA/FMECA may include the following [16]:  
(a) to identify the failures which have unwanted impacts on the system operation,  
(b) to identify the techniques to improve the system reliability (such as design modifications and 
development of an item),  
(c) to satisfy the customer’s contractual requirements,  
(d) to develop a reliability test program, 
 
 
(e) to provide a maintenance planning and support such as through the reliability centered maintenance,  
(f) to identify the system risks for risk management.  
The general concept of FMECA has been explained by IEC 60812:2018 [16] and MIL-STD-1629A [17]. 
According to the system, the failure modes should be identified and the impact of different modes on the 
system performance should be predicted. A failure mode criticality can be measured by a risk index of 
system, R, where it is defined as the product of severity, S, and probability of the failure mode, P, as: 
 R S P=      (1) 
in which the severity is the impacts or consequences of the failure mode on the system performance. The 
term criticality can also be affected by the failure detectability, D, which is defined as the chance of 
identifying and mitigating the failure before the system is affected. Hence, the Risk Priority Number (RPN) 
can be defined by using (2) as another criticality index. 
  RPN S P D=       (2) 
The criticality of different failure modes can be estimated by using (1) or (2). The criticality of an item, 
hence, can be obtained by cumulating the criticality of failure modes involving the corresponding 
component. The highest criticality number identifies the most critical components. Moreover, the other 
quantitative or qualitative measures can also be used for criticality assessment based on the type of system 
[16, 17]. Then, the qualitative criticality matrix and qualitative/qualitative criticality plots can be used to rank 
the system components criticality based on the corresponding impact on the system risk. A criticality plot 
enables identification of the criticality rank by defining suitable criticality boundaries. 
B. Proposed FMECA for PEPSs 
The proposed FMECA for PEPSs is based on the contingency analysis in reliability assessment of 
conventional power systems [18]. In this approach, a single and multiple outage events are considered and 
the reliability of the system associated with the corresponding outage is evaluated. This approach is adopted 
here for FMECA as shown in Fig. 1. The system states, including outage of one or multiple components, can 
be identified by the state enumeration technique. Then, the contingency analysis is performed in order to 
figure out the consequences of each outage events. To do so, the security assessment [19] can be performed 
to figure out the contingency effects on the steady state and dynamic performance of the system. After any 
contingency, the system might be subjected to steady state or dynamic performance violations. Steady state 
overloading of transmission lines and bus voltages together with transient and dynamic instability of voltage, 
frequency, and rotor angle may cause severe issues to the overall system operation. If the system security 
associated with the selected contingency is ensured, then it is not a failure mode in the system. Otherwise, a 
suitable remedial action should be carried out to keep the system as secure as possible. The remedial actions 
could be load curtailment, generation re-scheduling, network splitting, network re-configuring, and so on. 
After applying a remedial action, the system security should be assured by security re-assessment. The next 
step is analyzing the socioeconomic consequences of the contingency by performance measures such as loss 
of load or energy, loss of generation, fine of generation re-scheduling, social impacts, and so on. In power 
systems, the effects of an outage event on the generation, transmission and distribution level, can be 
measured by various risk indices. For instance, indices such as Expected Energy Not Supplied (EENS) or 
Loss Of Load Expectations (LOLE) can be used to measure the impacts of component outages on the 
customer supply [18]. Moreover, the generation power affected by an outage can be determined by the Power 
Not Produced (PNP) and Expected Energy Not Produced (EENP) [20].  
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Fig. 1. Flow of proposed FMECA for power electronic based power systems. 
If the contingency is appeared as a failure mode, the mode criticality, Ek, can be defined by using (3). 
 
k k k
E P =      (3) 
where, Ψk denotes as the failure mode consequences and Pk is its probability. Furthermore, the failure mode 
probability Pk is defined by using (4). 
 ( ) ( )
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1
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= =
=  −      (4) 
where, Uk|j is the unavailability of component j’s outage in the state k with failure rate of λj and repair time 
of rj as given in (5).  
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U =      (5) 
N is the number of total events and Nf is the order of outage events including any multiple components 
outage. The criticality of a component can also be defined by cumulating the criticality index of the modes 
involving that component [17]. Hence, the component criticality can be obtained by using (6): 
  
j
j k
k
C E

=      (6) 
in which, Cj denotes the criticality index of component j, and Φj denotes the set of outage events caused by 
component j. This procedure will be repeated for all system states to identify the criticality of any outages.  
 Case Study 
The proposed FMECA is exemplified by a wind farm as a PEPS in this section. The structure of the wind 
farm and numerical studies are presented in the following.   
 
 
A. Power Electronic based Power System Structure 
In this study, a 60-MW wind farm consisting of 20×3-MW DFIG-based Wind Turbine (WT) is 
considered as shown in Fig. 2. The wind farm is connected to the grid through an HVDC transmission system. 
The system includes four main sub-systems comprising WT, wind side Voltage Source Converter (VSC 
Wind), DC Transmission Line (DCTL), and grid side converter (VSC Grid). The reliability of WTs is 
modeled by 12 components, and VSCs are modeled by 8 components as shown in Fig. 3 [7]. Therefore, the 
total number of components in the reliability diagram is 265 as shown in Fig. 3 which can be considered for 
FMECA to find out the critical components. The reliability data of components are summarized in Table I 
[7]. The FMECA analysis and results are presented in the following section.  
WT 11
Wind Farm HVDC
DC Cable
100 km
VSC Grid
VSC Wind 1
VSC Wind 2
AC Grid
WT 101
WT 12
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NOTE: WT Xk: Wind Turbine X 
connected to VSC Wind k
 
Fig. 2. Power System Structure with a Wind farm and HVDC system. 
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Fig. 3. Reliability model of the wind farm shown in Fig. 2. 
 
 
Table I.  Wind Farm-HVDC outage data [7] (occ: occurrence DCTL: DC Transmission Line). 
Sub-system Component Failure rate (occ/yr) Average repair time (hrs) Uk 
W
in
d
 T
u
rb
in
e 
S
y
st
em
 
Tower 0.006 104.1 7.13E-05 
Hub 0.001 12.5 1.43E-06 
Blades/Pitch 0.052 91.6 5.44E-04 
Gearbox 0.045 256.7 1.32E-03 
Drive train 0.004 291.4 1.33E-04 
Generator 0.021 210.7 5.05E-04 
Yaw 0.026 259.4 7.70E-04 
Sensors 0.054 49.4 3.05E-04 
Control system 0.05 184.6 1.05E-03 
Break system 0.005 125.4 7.16E-05 
Converter 0.067 106.6 8.15E-04 
Transformer 0.02 200 4.57E-04 
H
V
D
C
 V
S
C
 
Converter 0.5 4 2.28E-04 
Converter Reactor 0.006585 25 1.88E-05 
Transformer 0.0309 24 8.47E-05 
Capacitor 0.05 11.55 6.59E-05 
AC Filter 0.0833 10.5 9.98E-05 
DC Filter 0.4 12 5.48E-04 
Control System 1.3095 8 1.20E-03 
Break System 0.001 40 4.57E-06 
DCTL DCTL 0.003 500 1.71E-04 
B. Numerical Analysis 
In this paper, the first and second order outage events are considered since the higher order outages 
probability is negligible. The probability of outage events is calculated using (4). Afterwards, the effect of 
outages on the PNP is determined. In this paper, the wind regime for all WTs is considered to be the same, 
and the system is operating at an average power of 3 MW per WT.  
Using the reliability data given in Table I, the probability of single/double outages and the corresponding 
PNP and EENP are calculated and reported in Table II  for the first 30 important events in a descending order 
of EENP. The likelihood of failure modes against the corresponding consequence, which is loss of generation 
power, is illustrated in the criticality plot shown in Fig. 4. Obviously, the component 28 (control of grid side 
VSC) introduces the highest risk to the system, where its probability is 0.001056 according to Table II and 
60 MW power will be disconnected. Components 19 (control of wind side VSC) and 27 (DC filter of grid 
side VSC) are the next critical components.  
Table II.  FMECA results. 
Component outage Pk PNP (MW) EENP (MWhr/yr) 
28 0.001056 60 555.0336 
19 0.001056 30 277.5168 
27 0.000482 60 253.4653 
18 0.000482 30 126.7326 
22 0.000200 600 105.4563 
21 0.000150 60 79.0922 
13 0.000200 30 52.7281 
26 0.000087 60 46.1602 
24 0.000074 60 39.1761 
4 0.001161 3 30.5268 
25 0.000057 60 30.4805 
9 0.000924 3 24.2827 
17 0.000087 30 23.0801 
15 0.000074 30 19.5880 
11 0.000717 3 18.8480 
7 0.000677 3 17.8073 
16 0.000057 30 15.2402 
3 0.000478 3 12.5807 
6 0.000444 3 11.6788 
4-19 1.3904E-06 33 0.4011 
191-192 1.2584E-06 33 0.3307 
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Fig. 4. Criticality plot illustrating the critical components of the system – 28:VSC grid control, 27: VSC 
grid DC Filter, 19: VSC wind control.  
According to (6) the component criticality can be found by accumulating the EENP of outage events 
involving the corresponding component. The criticality of individual components is shown in Fig. 5. 
Following this figure, the control system of the grid side VSC is the most critical component. The second 
critical component is the control system of wind side VSC followed by DC filter of grid side and wind side 
VSCs. Afterwards, grid side converter, DC transmission line, and wind side converter are the next critical 
components respectively. 
The obtained results show the criticality of the grid side VSC (converter + control) and then the wind side 
VSC (converter + control). The WT converter (converter + control) has a low criticality compared to the 
HVDC converters even though they have almost the same unavailability as given in Table I. This is due to 
the effect of the corresponding converters on the system level reliability, where the PNP is 3 MW for WT 
converter outage and 60 MW for the HVDC converter outage. In the exemplified wind farm, this fact could 
be visually deduced because of the symmetry in the grid topology. However, in a general power electronic 
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Fig. 5. Criticality analysis results based on FMECA. 
 
 
 
based power system with different power converters in generation, transmission and distribution levels, the 
FMECA approach can properly identify the critical converters of the system.  This approach shows the 
weakest links of the system and its sub-systems. For instance, the gear-box and control system are the two 
most critical component of the WT sub-system as shown in Fig. 5. However, its importance is quite low in 
the overall system performance. Therefore, one component may have the highest interest for one sub-system, 
here the wind generation company, while it has low importance for the overall system.  
The contribution of different categories consisting of control systems, power converters, DC Filters, WT 
mechanical systems, and other parts on the risk of different sub-systems are illustrated in Fig. 6. Fig. 6(a) 
highlights the 31% contribution of power electronics on the reliability of WTs, and the mechanical system 
failure has the dominant impact on their performance. However, the impact of power electronics on the 
HVDC system reliability is quite dominant (61%) as shown in Fig. 6(b). Meanwhile, the control has the 
same as the converter on the WTs reliability as shown in Fig. 6(a). The impact of control is 5 times of the 
converter in the HVDC system as shown in Fig. 6(b). The contribution of power electronics, mechanical 
system and DC filters on the overall system reliability is shown in Fig. 6(c) implying that the power 
electronics has 44% contribution on the total system risk. The impact of the mechanical system comprising 
of various components (Tower, Hub, …) is 32%. Following Fig. 6(c), the control system of power electronics 
is more important that converters. Notably, the obtained results rely on the historical reliability data which 
are reported in [7].  
 Conclusions 
This paper has explored the criticality of power electronic converters in power systems by Failure Mode, 
Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA). A 60-MW wind farm has been studied, which is connected to 
the grid through an HVDC transmission line. The wind turbines and HVDC converters are modeled 
according to the historical reliability data. The obtained results show that the power electronics has 44% 
contribution on the overall reliability of the studied wind farm. Power electronics is also the critical 
component of each sub-system. The analysis shows the criticality of HVDC converter control system and its 
DC filters. The grid side converter is the next critical component followed by the DC transmission line and 
wind side converter. Furthermore, the individual wind converter has less impact on the overall system 
reliability. The gear-box is the most critical component of a wind turbine system, and the next important 
components of wind turbines are its control system and converter. As a result, the converter control system 
is a dominant factor affecting the system reliability which should be improved by converter manufacturers. 
Moreover, identifying the critical modes and components can be beneficial for optimal and economical 
design, planning, operation, and time-efficient modeling of power electronic based power systems. 
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Fig. 6. Contribution of different categories in the risk of (a) wind turbines, (b) HVDC, and (c) wind farm. 
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